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Abstract
The international community often seeks to promote political reforms in recalcitrant
states. Recently, some scholars have argued that, rather than helping, international law
and advocacy create new problems because they have negative spillovers that increase
rights violations. We review three mechanisms for such spillovers: backlash, trade-offs,
and counteraction and concentrate on the last of these. Some researchers assert that
governments sometimes “counteract” international human rights pressures by
strategically substituting violations in adjacent areas that are either not targeted or are
harder to monitor. However, most such research shows only that both outcomes correlate
with an intervention -- the targeted positively and the spillover negatively. The burden of
proof, however, should be as rigorous as those for studies of first-order policy
consequences. We show that these correlations by themselves are insufficient to
demonstrate counteraction outside of the narrow case where the intervention is assumed
to have no direct effect on the spillover, a situation akin to having a valid instrumental
variable design. We revisit two prominent findings and show that the evidence for the
counteraction claim is weak in both cases. The article contributes methodologically to the
study of negative spillovers in general by proposing mediation and sensitivity analysis
within an instrumental variables framework for assessing such arguments. It revisits
important prior findings that claim negative consequences to human rights law and/or
advocacy and raises critical normative questions regarding how we empirically evaluate
hypotheses about causal mechanisms.
Acknowledgments: We thank Emilie Hafner-Burton and Yonatan Lupu for sharing their
data and commenting on earlier versions of this idea. Thanks also to Aila Matanock,
Sarah Bermeo, Jason Klocek, Charlie Clotfelter, Geoffrey Dancy, Chris Fariss, Yuqing
Hu, Tana Johnson, Emily Ritter, John Singleton, Michael Ward, Will Moore, Yiqing Xu,
and Wei Song for insightful comments on earlier drafts.
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Policymakers and scholars have long been concerned with the efficacy of
international efforts to reform recalcitrant states. Studies have focused on the
effectiveness of a range of tools from military interventions and sanctions to softer
methods such as shaming and persuasion or facilitative instruments such as treaty
commitments, education, and capacity training to achieve political reform. One area that
has elicited close scrutiny has been efforts to improve human rights. Have norms
ensconced in international law helped guide the development of better practices and
protections? Have efforts to expose human rights violations incentivized better
government behavior? For a long time, research concentrated on demonstrating positive
effects; the null hypothesis was ineffectiveness.
As human rights research has matured, scholars have started asking whether wellintended interventions sometimes may have benefits while also causing harm. 1 For
example, has civil society advocacy simply caused flagrant rights violations to become
stealthier? Have international legal commitments proscribing specific behaviors, such as
political imprisonment, diverted abuses to worse outcomes like disappearance? Have
rights commitments crowded out development objectives? Is all the attention on negative
rights responsible for fleeting attention to social justice and equality? In short, is the
rights agenda virtually doomed not only to be ineffective but to cause more damage to
humankind than it has done good?

On the unintended consequences of human rights interventions such as international law and advocacy, see
Conrad and DeMeritt 2014; Hafner-Burton 2008; Kennedy 2002; Lupu 2013; Posner 2008; Simmons and
Strezhnev 2017. This focus has also been prominent in the foreign aid and sanctions literature. See Ahmed
2012; Morrison 2009; Weiss et al. 1997; Wood 2008. See also the rule-of-law literature Carothers 2003;
Kleinfeld 2012 and the democracy literature Kelley 2011; Simpser and Donno 2012.
1
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Such questions are important for both scholars and practitioners. Given their focus
on constrained or adaptive human behavior, these questions can inform the ongoing
theoretical debate about the relationship between international and national actors, law
and politics, and civil society and government agents. Such questions hold tremendous
policy relevance. Advocates and policymakers must consider the benefits and the costs of
their actions, as well as their distributional and moral consequences. This is not possible,
however, if unintended consequences are not fully examined and incorporated. Scholars
are right to ask questions about possible negative effects of policy interventions.
As important as it is to study an intervention’s negative spillovers, it is also
important to recognize that this study is fraught with challenges. Appropriately, tests for
first-order consequences have confronted the plethora of typical methodological
criticisms surrounding causal inference, but claims of second-order, unintended
consequences often do not garner such a hard kick to the evidentiary tires. Social
scientists should not give unintended consequences a causal pass. Good social science
and sound policy advice demand that we test for the mechanisms suspected of negative
effects just as thoroughly as we do the causal mechanisms associated with first-order
positive claims and articulate clearly the evidence for the mechanism leading to net
negative outcomes. The famous Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom caution that we cannot
attribute compliance to states that ratify treaties because they were going to improve
anyway is conversely apt. 2 When bad states do bad things and get criticized for it, the
same logic must apply, with a symmetrical burden of proof. Too few researchers ask

2

Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996.
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whether the bad news about repression is bad news about international law and/or human
rights advocacy, or were these states going to misbehave anyway?
We call attention to the evidentiary deficits in much of the research on negative
spillovers from the promotion of human rights norms and offer a rigorous way to test
such claims. We first describe three distinct mechanisms through which human rights
interventions are said to cause negative consequences: backlash, trade-offs, and
counteraction. Claims of these consequences crop up repeatedly in the critical human
rights literature as unintended spillovers caused by well-intended but naive human rights
interventions, such as international legalization, enhanced monitoring, or human rights
advocacy.
After discussing these mechanisms, we focus specifically on counteraction and
propose a rigorous way to detect its presence. We highlight how finding evidence of
counteraction can be understood as a form of mediation analysis and illustrate how the
approaches taken in the existing literature can be formulated as instrumental variables
(IV) designs. In attempting to identify the effect of a variable targeted by an intervention
on an unintended spillover quantity, the intervention is essentially assumed to act as an
instrument, affecting the spillover only through its effect on the targeted outcome. Such a
relationship is often implausible and so our proposed method provides a sensitivity
analysis to relax this implicit assumption.3 The goal is to decompose the observed effect
of the intervention (for example, a treaty commitment, an advocacy effort) into indirect

Within the literature on international organizations, sensitivity analyses are a rare but increasingly valuable
tool for evaluating the robustness of research designs. Most applications focus on assessing sensitivity of
effect estimates in observational designs to unobserved confounding—for example, see Chaudoin, Hays, and
Hicks 2018 which uses a variety of placebo tests on theoretically unrelated outcomes to illustrate likely biases
in designs estimating the effect of treaty adoption.
3
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and direct components (the former flow through the change in the intended target
quantity, while direct components are unintended by the intervener, and might include a
range of reactions or trade-offs). This sensitivity analysis holds fixed the direct effect at a
range of feasible values and provides estimates of the implied indirect effects. We apply
this approach to two prior studies that warn of counteraction to illustrate what this
method can reveal when the evidence for counteraction is weak to non-existent. Although
our substantive focus here is on human rights, our approach applies to other issue areas as
well. The broader purpose is to strengthen causal inference about specific mechanisms
through which spillovers might occur.

Human Rights and Unintended Consequences
International efforts to promote human rights have been said to “produce” harm in
several ways. The research can be distilled to three mechanisms: backlash, trade-offs, and
counteraction (Table 1).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Backlash is often said to be a consequence of external norms and rights advocacy.
Backlash refers to a strong, negative, public, and often angry societal reaction to political
or social change. It is a social reaction rather than an individual response or a calculated
policy decision, 4 and it may worsen other rights, or lead to entrenchment or regress on

Which is why it often is featured in analyses of advocacy for contested social issues such as freedom of
religion (Rafi and Chowdhury 2000) and nondiscrimination on the basis of sex or sexual orientation
(Epprecht 2012).
4
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the targeted right. 5 For example, in some societies, external pressure to promote women’s
rights could lead to a doubling-down on more conservative social demands by opponents
of such rights, and eventually even alter policies. In contrast to trade-offs and
counteraction (discussed later), backlash tends to be public and defiant. Backlash can be
and often is instigated at the top by power holders who are in some way threatened by the
assertion of a rights claim and thus are motivated to stir up opposition to particular
human rights practices or to foreign influence in general. 6 It can be a direct response to
criticism (for example, nationalist sentiments in response to foreign shaming) 7 or it can
be indirect (e.g., operate through a rights improvement which in turn provokes social or
political opposition). While backlash can describe any form of opposition -- some
scholars describe “liberal” backlash against rights violations for example 8 -- we
understand it as reasonably broad-based countermobilization against international human
rights law, advocacy, or practice, whether or not rights improvements are realized on the
ground. 9
Theorists of social movements see backlash as a common though hardly an
inevitable occurrence in response to challenges to existing power structures or norms. 10

Some scholars use the word backlash to include considered public policy choices (see, for example, Helfer
2017; Sikkink 2013) but here we distinguish social reactions from policy choices meant to reverse or blunt a
human rights constraint (counteraction, discussed later). Sometimes these concepts merge and overlap, for
example, when a well-entrenched official structure is deeply and widely embedded in society, like the
“backlash” of the communist party prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Thomas 2001, chapter 6) or
religious officials in religious societies. Rafi and Chowdhury 2000.
6
Vinjamuri 2017, 120//---//22.
7
Snyder 2019.
8
Vinjamuri 2017, 116, 118. There is also literature suggesting backlash to right abuses, for example, arguing
that torture increases violent opposition and the incidence of terrorism (Daxecker 2017) or that the torture
memos elicited backlash against the Bush administration (Sikkink 2013).
9
This definition may involve but goes well beyond negative individual emotional responses to criticism
documented in the psychology literature (e.g., Scheff 2000).
10
Tsutsui, Whitlinger, and Lim 2012. Quantitative research that finds at least short-run positive consequences
to human rights shaming efforts include Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012; Franklin 2008.
5
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Some go further to claim a causal chain of events that runs from international human
rights law/advocacy to domestic anti-government mobilization, 11 which then triggers
backlash, which in turn contributes to worsening repression. The exact consequences are
not always clear, but Hopgood, Snyder, and Vinjamuri claim that backlash may be
associated with “pernicious, longer-term effects that may lock in regressive practices,” 12
including strategically altering laws and institutions that are more likely to violate rights
than to protect them. This is an important claim that runs in the opposite direction of
much research claiming that law and advocacy helps rights claimants to mobilize for
human rights, with generally positive consequences. 13 Importantly, however, such claims
need to be tested with carefully specified models; if the claim is that human rights law
and advocacy have caused backlash, then it is critically important to show that any
regression in rights is not simply a symptom of broader authoritarian trends. 14
Tradeoffs. A second genre of critique is that the international human rights regime
promotes specific legal rights at the expense of other human values. The claim is
constructed around a notional resource constraint that implies that effort dedicated to
human rights necessarily reduces resources available for other desirable ends. There are
several variations on the trade-offs theme. Interventions that press for human rights could
unintentionally divert funds from development projects; 15 they could increase attention to
negative rights, while distracting attention from economic and social rights; 16 they could

This step of the argument is the focus of Murdie and Bhasin 2011 who present evidence that the nature and
degree of anti-government mobilization is conditional on the source of what they call “shaming.”
12
Hopgood, Snyder, and Vinjamuri 2017, 312.
13
Simmons 2009.
14
Ambrosio 2016.
15
Posner 2008.
16
Moyn 2010.
11
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denigrate human needs that cannot be formulated in rights terms at all; 17 they could favor
one protected category of people at the expense of others, 18 and so forth. Eric Posner,
perhaps the bluntest proponent of this argument, asserts that “human rights obligations
interfere with welfare-promoting activities of the government, and these welfarepromoting activities should be given priority.” 19
These arguments all assume that a human rights trade-off occurs when power
holders improve their policies in the area the intervention targets, but these improvements
worsen nontargeted values, such as economic growth, justice, or equality. The choice to
respond to the external intervention is strategic, but the result (better rights leading to
poorer growth, worsening equality, or shoddy social justice) is undesired and unintended
by both the pro-rights intervenors and likely even the targeted respondent.
Logically, for a trade-off to exist, the targeted rights and the outcome would have
to be strict substitutes and not complements. 20 That is, we would have to believe that the
prioritized rights such as fair trials, women’s political equality, freedom of conscience, or
a child’s right to health care do not themselves make a positive net contribution to other
aspects of human welfare, such as economic development, tolerance, or justice.
“Foregrounding” arguments -- the idea that advocating right M causally reduces attention
and therefore attainment of right Y -- have a similar trade-off structure, though typically

Kennedy 2004.
Hurd 2017.
19
Posner 2008.
20
We are more interested in the logical structure of the trade-off argument here, but it is worth noting that
the weight of existing research suggests it is highly implausible, primarily because most human rights and
other welfare outcomes are complements not competitors. On the link between education and economic
development see Fägerlind and Saha 2014; on the positive developmental impact of closing the educational
gap for disadvantaged ethnic groups see Calver 2015; on the impact of both health and education on
productivity and growth, see Alvi and Ahmed 2014; on the impact of adequate housing on development see
Harris and Arku 2006.
17
18
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they are made in cognitive rather than strict budgetary terms. Elizabeth Hurd argues, for
example, that protecting religious freedom renders groups other than Christians, Hindus,
and Jews “inaudible.” 21 Moreover, when religious freedom is a priority, “violations of
human dignity that fail to register as religious infringements languish beneath the
threshold of national and international recognition as the international community
dedicates limited resources to rescuing persecuted religionists.” 22 For Posner, advocating
human rights competes with human welfare; for Hurd, advocating religious rights
competes with the rights of women, racial minorities, and the disabled. For these claims
to hold, there must be a negative effect of a targeted right on a “spillover” outcome;
otherwise, there is no reason to believe that a causal resource trade-off, whether tangible
or cognitive, exists. So far, we have seen little systematic evidence of these claims, and
none that would pass traditional tests for causality. 23 And yet, such claims easily morph
into causal claims and, even more dangerously, claims that rights advocates are inflicting
real harm. 24
Finally, we define a particular type of harm that we call counteraction, our focus
in the rest of this article. Assuming an intervention seeks to spur improvements in human
rights, counteraction occurs when power holders respond to the intervention by
improving their behavior for the specific rights the intervention targets but then offsett
these improvements by increasing other types of misconduct. It is a strategic response by
a government to circumvent international pressure to improve its conduct in a particular
Hurd 2017, 208.
Ibid., 204. It is not clear whether Hurd means cognitive or budgetary resources; for our purposes it could
be either or both.
23
See the discussion in Simmons and Strezhnev 2017.
24
For example, volume editors Hopgood, Snyder and Vinjamuri summarize Hurd’s contribution as
showing that “the very activities of human rights promoters may bring about a deterioration in the longterm prospects for human rights observance.” Hopgood, Snyder, and Vinjamuri 2017, 18.
21
22
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issue area. Like trade-offs that may be made under budgetary or cognitive constraints,
counteraction spurs improvements in the targeted area M but reduces rights in the
spillover areas Y. It differs from interventions that merely displace the same or nearly
identical type of misconduct by simply moving it to a different time or place, thus
rendering the intervention (merely) ineffective in changing the net effect on the targeted
behavior. 25 Instead, counteraction involves shifts between different types of misconduct
so that the intervention may cause new types of problems or increase the severity of
another set of problems. It is fundamentally a causal hypothesis about the effect that
changes in one form of behavior have on another area. It inherently involves first a rights
improvement, the consequences of which government agents seek to reverse with
alternative forms of repression. In contrast to backlash, which is a social reaction and can
be either the direct response to shaming alone or a response to targeted rights
improvements that social forces then lash back against, counteraction suggests that
protecting targeted rights causes compensatory strategic repression in another area and
may, depending on how one weighs the costs and benefits, do more harm than good.
One of the most in-depth discussions of counteraction is the qualitative study of
torture by Darius Rejali who argues that high-quality human rights monitoring has led to
innovative forms of stealth torture, even (or especially) in democracies. 26 Quantitative
studies have also sought to document counteraction. 27 For example, Hafner-Burton

For example, in a study of Ghana, Ichino, and Schundeln 2012 found that domestic monitoring merely
shifted excess voter registration to unmonitored areas. The type of problem did not change//--//it just moved
elsewhere. It also differs from cases, which we suspect are rare, in which an intervention causes positive
consequences in some countries but negative consequences of the same kind elsewhere (sets of states may
be heterogenous). Conrad and Ritter 2013.
26
Rejali 2007. However, while such substitution has been found to occur, Rejali comes closer to claiming
that monitoring has not been effective than claiming that is has net negative effects.
27
In the next section we show these studies do not use methods that support causal inferences.
25
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claims that international shaming improves political rights, but that it also “often”
correlates with more political terror, 28 and suggests that one possible explanation is that
“governments are strategically using some violations to offset other improvements they
make in response to international pressure to stop violations.” 29 Similarly, Conrad and
McDermitt find that when the United Nations shames countries specifically for torture,
political rights deteriorate. 30 Likewise, Lupu notes that countries that ratify the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) improve political rights but
have more victims of disappearances. He cautiously suggests that “if the cost of using
certain types of repressive techniques increases, governments may become more likely to
use other, less costly options.” 31
Given their appeal to governments who want to maintain power by hook or by
crook, such claims seem plausible and perhaps even intuitive. However, there are also
reasons that the appearance of these various spillovers may be deceptive. Despite its
theoretical appeal, counteraction may not be the most plausible -- and certainly not the
only -- mechanism for explaining an observed correlation between a given behavior and a
particular international (or for that matter, domestic) intervention. 32
All three mechanisms through which scholars make claims that international
human rights interventions have had negative consequences have the same evidentiary
burdens as any other causal claim. Such claims go well beyond skepticism that such
interventions are merely ineffective. That human rights interventions have not eliminated

Hafner-Burton 2008 See also, for example, Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012.
Hafner-Burton 2008.
30
Conrad and DeMeritt 2014.
31
Lupu 2013, 492.
32
Moore 1998.
28
29
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rights abuses is hardly news, and we accept that it is the burden of the so-called optimists
to demonstrate any improvements. But if backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction are
claimed to worsen rights, then such claims are subject to similar demands that causality
be scrutinized, possible spuriousness be taken seriously, and selection problems be
considered.

Methodological Focus: Modelling Counteraction
The Problem: Modelling the Hypothesized Mechanism
Counteraction deserves attention because researchers have attempted to
demonstrate its negative consequences. Yet the causal minefield is evident and there are
several reasons to be skeptical about broad counteraction claims. The first issue is
traditional selection effects. Arendt noticed well before there was much international
shaming that dictators facing challenges to their rule often increase repression or
torture. 33 Considering the obvious selection effects should give scholars pause before
jumping to conclusions about law and advocacy. 34 Repressive governments behave badly
in multiple areas; their patterns of rights violations tend to look more like complements
than substitutes. 35 Interventions such as shaming target countries with worsening rights
create a classic selection effect. Thus, although Conrad and DeMeritt argue that “when a
state is put on notice for torture, it responds by securing its own grasp on power, limiting
empowerment rights,” 36 they cannot rule out that the UN may simply shame countries

Arendt 1970.
Conrad and Ritter 2013; Vreeland 2008.
35
Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014.
36
Conrad and DeMeritt 2014, 22//---//23. This is a shift in the opposite direction of what Hafner-Burton
2008 suggested in response to more general shaming.
33
34
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with more, and possibly worsening torture, 37 rather than cause more torture.
A further methodological problem that may lead us to question broad
counteraction claims is that so far scholars have used separate models to test separately
for correlation between the intervention and each outcome. For example, Lupu’s finding
that ratification of the ICCPR correlates with improved political rights and with increased
victims of disappearances is based on two separate models that do not connect these
correlations to one another. Contrary to his cautiously worded conclusion, 38 this cannot
demonstrate substitution. A difference in the intervention’s effect on the targeted
outcome and its effect on the substituted outcome implies only that there may be some
combination of backlash, counteraction, trade-off, or simple spuriousness. Decomposing
the underlying mechanisms requires additional assumptions.
Why should we be skeptical? First, the intervention may affect one outcome in
one subset of observations but affect another outcome in another subset of observations.
Since effects are identified as averages only, we cannot immediately conclude that these
patterns reflect substitution at the level of the individual state. Second, the assumption
that governments have a “menu of manipulation,” 39 and can easily shift to new
techniques of repression does not hold since repressors are already likely to choose the
most efficient means of control. 40 Third, and crucial for our method here, the effects of
the intervention alone are not the quantity of interest for assessing counteraction.
Counteraction implies a causal pathway linking the intervention, the targeted outcome,
and the spillover. Thus, the targeted outcome must affect the spillover. Separate models

37

Conrad and DeMeritt 2014, 15.
“Results provide empirical evidence that such substitution may occur.” Lupu 2013, 492.
39
Davenport 2007; Schedler 2002.
40
Moore 2000.
38
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thus suffice if and only if we assume counteraction is the only possible causal
mechanism. This restrictive assumption is unlikely to hold in any real-world situation. It
also effectively assumes away what a researcher is obligated to examine: how, exactly,
do better rights demands make things worse? Under what conditions can we expect such
causal deterioration? Causal mechanisms must therefore be scrutinized, which is more
difficult than to provide evidence for overall correlations. 41
A final reason to be skeptical of broad counteraction claims is that case studies
often underscore the importance of heterogeneous contexts. Kuperman’s findings that
rhetorical support for human rights can backfire in civil war settings with heavily armed
and revolutionary rebel groups is a highly conditional argument. 42 So are the scope
conditions for Risse and Sikkink’s “spiral model,” which requires a combination of
transnational advocates, active domestic human rights organizations, and foreign
government support to produce internalization of human rights norms. 43 Switching
between strategies in response to external norms or monitoring is likely highly
constrained -- and certainly not similar -- for such heterogenous cases.

Formalizing Counteraction Effects
We propose a method for assessing the plausibility of counteraction when we
observe an intervention’s contrasting effects on two outcomes. 44 We apply this approach
to evaluate counteraction claims made by two influential studies. To start, we review the

Green, Ha, and Bullock 2010.
Kuperman 2004.
43
Risse and Sikkink 1999.
44
When backlash is mediated through rights improvements//--//that is, when the reaction is against the shift
in rights enjoyment and not just foreign shaming//--//the model we suggest here is appropriate as well.
41
42

14

framework for causal mediation analysis developed in Robins and Greenland and Pearl
and introduced to political science by Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto. 45 The causal
quantities of interest are formalized using the conventional Neyman-Rubin potential
outcomes framework. 46 Assume a total of 𝑁𝑁 units, each indexed by 𝑖𝑖. Let 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 be the

observed spillover or offsetting outcome of interest, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 be the observed outcome targeted
by the intervention, and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 be the observed level of the intervention. For simplicity, we
focus on the case of a binary 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and binary 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 but our approach can be extended to

continuous variables with additional modeling assumptions. Define 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎) as the potential

offsetting outcome that we would observe if unit 𝑖𝑖 were assigned to take on an

intervention value of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = a. The intervention’s total effect for unit 𝑖𝑖 is the difference
𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (1) − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (0).

Causal mediation methods focus on different ways to decompose the total

treatment effect into a “direct” component and an “indirect” component attributable to
some mediator 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 . To motivate these decompositions, we need to define additional

counterfactual outcomes for both 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 and 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 , following standard practice in the mediation

literature. First, we define 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎) as the targeted outcome we would observe if unit 𝑖𝑖 were

assigned intervention 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎. Then, we define a joint potential outcome, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎, 𝑚𝑚), which
denotes the potential offsetting outcome we would observe if unit 𝑖𝑖 were assigned 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 =

𝑎𝑎, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚. We further make the “composition” assumption that 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 �𝑎𝑎, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎)� = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎). 47

Using this framework, we can define additional counterfactual comparisons that permit

Imai et al. 2011; Pearl 2001; Robins and Greenland 1992.
Neyman 1923; Rubin 1974.
47
See VanderWeele and Vansteelandt 2009 for a broader discussion of the interpretation underlying this
particular formulation.
45
46
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the decomposition of the overall treatment effect. 48 The indirect or “causal mediation
effect” for unit 𝑖𝑖, holding fixed the intervention at some level 𝑎𝑎 is defined as
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎) = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 �𝑎𝑎, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (1)� − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (0))

In other words, the indirect effect is the difference in potential outcomes when a unit is
assigned the mediator value it would have under treatment compared to when that unit is
assigned the mediator it would have under control.
Conversely, the direct effect represents the change in the potential outcome for 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖

if the treatment were manipulated while the mediator is held constant at the level it would
take under either treatment or control, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎).

𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎) = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 �1, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎)� − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 �0, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎)�

The total effect 𝜏𝜏 for individual 𝑖𝑖 can be written as the sum 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎) + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖 (1 − 𝑎𝑎) for

𝑎𝑎 = 0, 1. In practice, researchers cannot directly estimate individual treatment effects and
instead focus on decomposing the average treatment effect 𝜏𝜏̅ into average direct and
indirect effects, denoted 𝜁𝜁 (̅ 𝑎𝑎) and 𝛿𝛿 ̅(𝑎𝑎).
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Figure 1 illustrates the connection between the causal pathways linking 𝐴𝐴, 𝑀𝑀, and

𝑌𝑌 and the three mechanisms discussed earlier. 49 Figure 1 shows three possible causal

arrows: (1) from 𝐴𝐴 to 𝑀𝑀, (2) from 𝑀𝑀 to 𝑌𝑌, and (3) from 𝐴𝐴 to 𝑌𝑌. The combination of paths
Imai et al. 2011 refer to the indirect effect as the “causal mediation effect.” Robins and Greenland 1992
term this the “pure indirect effect” when 𝑎𝑎 = 0 and the “total indirect effect” when 𝑎𝑎 = 1. See VanderWeele
2013, 2014 for alternative decompositions.
49
Pearl 2000. For exposition, we omit the presence of observed confounders between 𝐴𝐴 and 𝑌𝑌 along with
observed and unobserved confounders of 𝑀𝑀 and 𝑌𝑌.
48
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1 and 2 reflects the indirect effect of the intervention that flows through the targeted
outcome. Path 1 reflects the effect of the intervention on altering the targeted outcome
and path 2 the corresponding effect of that change in the targeted outcome on the
spillover. Conversely, path 3 reflects the direct effect unmediated by 𝑀𝑀. Counteraction

exists when (1) is positive and (2) is negative, implying an overall negative indirect effect
of A on Y through M.
Trade-offs and rights-mediated backlash operate through an analogous
mechanism. Direct backlash is captured in arrow (3), which denotes an effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌
that carries through entirely through a non-𝑀𝑀 mechanism. Notably, for a fixed overall

effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌, we can understand counteraction and direct backlash as competing
explanations for the same phenomenon. The plausibility of counteraction as an

explanation for A’s negative effect on Y is strengthened when the direct effect (3) is
either 0 or in a countervailing direction (positive). This intuition, which underpins many
of the arguments for counteraction effects, motivates our proposed sensitivity analysis for
assessing the indirect counteraction effect.
The path diagram approach to causal mediation in the social sciences has its roots
in the structural modeling framework introduced by Baron and Kenny. 50 This approach
assumes a set of simultaneous equation models for the outcome and mediator:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉1′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖1

𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉2′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2

𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼3 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉3′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3
50

Baron and Kenny 1986. See Zhao, Lynch Jr, and Chen 2010 for a modern review.
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where 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖1 , 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2 , 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3 are mean zero-error terms, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 denotes a vector of pre-

treatment covariates.

In this framework, 𝛽𝛽2 denotes the average effect of the treatment on the mediator,

𝛾𝛾 the mediator’s effect on the outcome, and 𝛽𝛽3 the treatment’s effect on the outcome

holding constant the mediator. Researchers have often interpreted the product 𝛽𝛽2 𝛾𝛾 as the

effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀 mediated by 𝑌𝑌. 51 Imai and colleagues provide a formal justification for

this estimator in the context of the potential outcomes framework and give the necessary
assumptions required to interpret 𝛽𝛽2 𝛾𝛾 as identifying the average causal mediation effect.

In addition to correctly specified outcome and mediator models, identifying the causal
mediation effect using the product of coefficients requires a sequential ignorability

assumption. This consists of two parts: first, that the intervention is ignorable or assigned
“as-if-random” conditional on pre-treatment covariates; second, that the mediator is
ignorable conditional on covariates and treatment. This requires ruling out the presence
of any confounders of the mediator and outcome that might be affected by treatment.
While identifying controlled direct effects requires weaker assumptions 52 -- permitting
the presence of observed post-treatment confounders -- it still requires researchers to
justify two ignorability assumptions: one for the intervention and another for the targeted
outcome. While Imai et. al. develop a sensitivity analysis framework to relax the second
part of sequential ignorability by allowing researchers to specify the degree of
unobserved confounding of 𝑀𝑀 and 𝑌𝑌 via the correlation between 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2 and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3 , we note that

51
52

MacKinnon et al. 2002
Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016.
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it is often difficult for researchers to develop reasonable beliefs about the magnitude of
this unobserved confounder and thereby interpret a sensitivity analysis.
We develop an alternative strategy that does not use sequential ignorability and
builds on the approach already taken by researchers studying counteraction -- using the
estimated effects of the intervention on the two outcomes. While we have pointed out that
such an approach alone does not directly assess the presence of counteraction, it does
provide the basis for a sensitivity analysis.

Connecting the “Two Effects” Strategy to Instrumental Variables
Among papers examining counteraction or trade-offs, it is extremely common to
see researchers arguing for substitution based on an observed positive association
between treatment 𝐴𝐴 and targeted outcome 𝑀𝑀 and an observed negative association

between treatment 𝐴𝐴 and offsetting outcome 𝑌𝑌. 53 Our method starts from the necessary
assumptions made to estimate these treatment effects: namely that there are no

unobserved pretreatment confounders of 𝐴𝐴 and 𝑀𝑀 and 𝐴𝐴 and 𝑌𝑌. Formally, researchers

assume

{𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎), 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎)} ⊥ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 | 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖

What can those two effects tell us about the effect of 𝑀𝑀 on 𝑌𝑌? As Imai and

colleagues illustrated, randomization of 𝐴𝐴 does not suffice to identify the direct and

indirect effects since it does not guarantee unconfoundedness of 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎)) and 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝑎𝑎).

Thus, randomization of A doesn’t guarantee there is no other omitted variable causing

A notable exception is Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014 who consider estimation of the overall dependence
structure across multiple measures of repression over time. However, the goal in our study is not to estimate
causal relationships between measures but to obtain an overall descriptive sense of how often these measures
positively or negatively co-vary over time and across states.

53
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both the mediator and the outcome. Using an auxiliary variable to assess counteraction is
structurally very similar to the well-studied problem of estimating effects via
instrumental variables (IV). In this case, 𝐴𝐴 acts as an instrument for 𝑀𝑀. 54 As in IV, the

researcher’s goal is to compare correlations between the instrument and the two other

variables to infer something about their causal relationship. Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin
formalize the IV assumptions in the potential outcomes framework and show that for the
case of a binary 𝐴𝐴 and a binary 𝑀𝑀 when 𝐴𝐴 (1) is exogenous, (2) has a non-zero and
monotonic effect on 𝑀𝑀, and (3) has no direct individual causal effect on 𝑌𝑌 that is

unmediated by 𝑀𝑀 (“exclusion restriction”), the treatment effect of 𝑀𝑀 on 𝑌𝑌 is identified

using the ratio of the effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌 and the effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀 -- the classic Wald ratio

estimator. 55 As the appendix shows, under these assumptions, the IV estimator identifies
𝑀𝑀′𝑠𝑠 direct effect on 𝑌𝑌 for the subgroup for which 𝐴𝐴 has an effect on 𝑀𝑀 (the “complier”

group). Additionally, researchers can incorporate covariates by assuming the linear

structural models from the previous section and estimating 𝛾𝛾 via two-stage least squares,
even in the presence of an unobserved confounder of 𝑀𝑀 and 𝑌𝑌

What additional assumptions are needed to apply the IV framework to mediation

analysis? We have already assumed (1) by virtue of assuming the (conditional)
ignorability of treatment 𝐴𝐴. Likewise, (2) can be partially tested from the data and

rejected in the absence of a strong first-stage effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀. Assumption (3) is the
necessary third element and is particularly questionable in the counteraction setting

54
This connection between IV and identification of path effects in mediation analysis has been mentioned in
the existing literature, most notably in Sobel 2008.
55
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996; Wald 1940. Notably, this effect is a “local” average treatment effect,
defined for the subsample of units which are compelled by the instrument to change their level of M. While
in many applications of IV, this is not necessarily a theoretically interesting group, for the purposes of
evaluating counteraction it is actually the precise subpopulation of interest.
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because it would imply that the intervention’s direct effect on the offsetting outcome
would be 0 for all units, regardless of the targeted outcome’s level. Indeed, a strict
exclusion restriction assumption would rule out all possible mechanisms by which A
affects Y besides counteraction, effectively assuming what researchers set out to
examine.
While researchers are unlikely to believe the exclusion restriction holds exactly
with respect to the treatment 𝐴𝐴, they may nevertheless have beliefs about the size and

direction of 𝐴𝐴′ s direct effect on 𝑌𝑌. A sensible question to ask is: “Given varying beliefs

about the exclusion restriction violation, do the observed effects of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀 and 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌

still support a counteraction story?” We suggest that applied researchers may still find the
IV strategy useful for assessing counteraction when combined with a formal sensitivity
analysis for the exclusion restriction. Our proposed approach resembles existing methods
for conducting formal sensitivity analyses for the assumption of “no omitted variables” in
observational studies. 56 These approaches assess a given causal effect’s robustness by reestimating the result under varying levels of assumed omitted variable bias. Findings that
remain statistically significant for a large range of potential omitted variable biases are
considered relatively robust to violations of the assumption. Our approach adopts the
same linear structural equation framework as the sensitivity analysis for sequential
ignorability proposed by Imai and colleagues, but manipulates a different sensitivity
parameter. Instead of assessing the magnitude of omitted variable bias confounding 𝑀𝑀

See Cinelli and Hazlett 2018; Imbens 2003; Oster 2019. For a general overview of sensitivity analysis
techniques in observational studies, see Rosenbaum 2002.
56
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and 𝑌𝑌 that would break a result, it instead examines the magnitude of the direct effect of
𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌 that would break the IV estimate of the effect of 𝑀𝑀 on 𝑌𝑌.

The particular approach to sensitivity analysis we propose here is similar to that

proposed by Conley, Hansen, and Rossi 57 for general violations of “exogeneity” in IV.
To briefly describe our approach, suppose that we knew the true direct effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑌𝑌

for each unit. We could then subtract this effect from the observed outcome to generate a
new outcome 𝑌𝑌 ∗ which the exclusion restriction holds for by definition. Applying the

standard instrumental variables analysis to the transformed outcome would then give a
valid estimate for the counteraction effect under the assumed violation. Repeatedly
carrying out this process for a range of feasible direct effects provides a set of possible
estimates for the counteraction effect. Under the linear structural equation framework, we
can estimate the effect of the mediator using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. 58

This commonly used approach to estimating IV effects allows researchers to
parsimoniously incorporate covariates in addition to handling situations where 𝐴𝐴 is not

necessarily binary. While this approach does make some additional assumptions

regarding effect homogeneity and correct model specification, these assumptions
approximate what researchers are already assuming to estimate the effects of policy
interventions using linear regression. 59 Existing sensitivity analyses for mediation also

Conley, Hansen, and Rossi 2012; Ertefaie et al. 2017; Huber 2014; Kraay 2012.
Angrist and Imbens 1995.
59
The assumption of constant treatment effect, for example, is not critical for interpreting the IV estimates.
As Angrist and Imbens 1995 illustrate, the 2SLS estimator is equivalent to a weighted average of treatment
effects across covariate strata. This is generally true of any regression-adjustment approach for estimating
average treatment effects. See Aronow and Samii 2016. Additionally, the assumption of correct model
specification is a prerequisite to nearly any observational study using regression adjustment.
57
58
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rely on the linear structural equation framework for simplicity. 60 We discuss the
assumptions in greater detail in the appendix.
The “first-stage” linear regression assumes the following model for M
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉2′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2

where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 denotes a vector of pretreatment covariates, 𝜉𝜉2′ a vector of parameters, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2 is
a mean zero-error term with finite variance. The parameter 𝛽𝛽2 denotes the average effect

of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀. Under conditional ignorability of treatment, this can be estimated consistently
via OLS since 𝐸𝐸[𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖2 |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ] = 0. 61 We assume another model for the outcome 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 :
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼3 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉3′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3

Note that 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 does not appear in this model, consistent with the exclusion restriction. After
�𝚤𝚤 are plugged into a
estimating the first-stage regression via OLS, the fitted values 𝑀𝑀

second regression with 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 as the outcome along with the same covariates 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 from the first

stage. This yields a consistent estimate of the coefficient 𝛾𝛾 even when sequential

ignorability does not hold and 𝐸𝐸[𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3 |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 , 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ] does not equal 0 -- that is, the outcome
and mediator model error terms are correlated.

As discussed, the exclusion of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 from the outcome model is an implausible

assumption in most empirical settings. To implement our sensitivity analysis, we assume
the following outcome model:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼3 + 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉3′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖3
See Imai et al. 2011 for a generalization of the mediation sensitivity analysis for sequential ignorability to
other outcome models.
61
One implicit IV assumption not discussed in the previous section is that the effect of 𝐴𝐴 on 𝑀𝑀 is monotonic
for all units in the sample, which the structural model here implicitly assumes by treating 𝛽𝛽2 as constant.
Monotonicity requires that the treatment effect of the policy on the targeted outcome cannot be positive for
some units and negative for others.
60
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and assume that 𝜌𝜌 is a known constant parameter. This corresponds to a model where, in
addition to its effect on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 , 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 also has a constant direct effect on 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 equal to 𝜌𝜌. This

allows us to define an augmented outcome 𝑌𝑌 ∗ for which the exclusion restriction holds by

definition.

𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − ρ𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖

For a reasonable set of values of 𝜌𝜌, we propose researchers estimate the IV effect of 𝑀𝑀 on

𝑌𝑌 ∗ and plot the resulting point estimates and confidence intervals against each choice of

ρ. While we are assuming a constant 𝜌𝜌 -- and by extension a constant treatment effect --

this is not an absolute requirement. In principle, a researcher could allow 𝜌𝜌 to vary across
units, though visualizing and interpreting the analysis with more than two sensitivity
parameters becomes rather challenging. In the appendix, we go further into the
interpretation of 𝜌𝜌 and its relation to sensitivity parameters used in other suggested
sensitivity analyses.

How should researchers choose what values of 𝜌𝜌 are feasible? By definition, 𝜌𝜌

itself depends on the scale of Y. We propose two approaches to assessing what would be
considered a “reasonable” direct effect. The first is to standardize 𝜌𝜌 and compare against
common benchmarks. A variety of possible standardizations exist -- we consider a

frequently used approach for standardizing effects of binary variables: Cohen’s d. This
quantity is defined as the unstandardized effect divided by the pooled standard deviation
of the outcome 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 , denoted 𝑠𝑠.

𝑑𝑑 =

𝜌𝜌
𝑠𝑠
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Transforming 𝜌𝜌 to 𝑑𝑑 allows us to evaluate the posited direct effects on a common scale - in terms of standard deviations of the outcome 62 Cohen provides a set of benchmarks for
determining what constitutes a “small,” “medium,” and “large” effect which can be
combined with theoretical expectations regarding the direct effect of 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 to determine the
plausibility of each IV estimate.

As an alternative to using these generic benchmarks, which may not necessarily
represent what is considered a “large” or “small” effect in the particular case being
studied, we also suggest benchmarking against the estimated effects of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 . This is similar
in spirit to the strategy used by Imbens for assessing the sensitivity estimatesto

unobserved confounding which compares the amount of confounding that is found to
break the finding to other known effects of variables in the data. 63 The estimated effect
of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 provides one reasonable benchmark because, in the case of human rights

violations, researchers typically have some theoretical beliefs about what types of rights
the policy intervention is likely to affect the most. It is often the case that a researcher
believes that any effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 will be largest for the targeted outcome and any direct effect

on the spillover outcomes is unlikely to be any larger. Given these beliefs, a researcher
would constrain the range of the sensitivity parameter 𝑑𝑑 to be no larger than the
standardized effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 .

Examples: International Treaties, Norms, and Shaming

62
63

Cohen 1992.
Imbens 2003.
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We apply our framework to two of the studies that make counteraction claims with
respect to human rights: Hafner-Burton and Lupu. 64 Hafner-Burton has been well-cited
for arguments about the negative consequences of international interventions. 65 Both
studies, in whole or in part, use country-year measures of respect for rights drawn from
the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) data set. Hafner-Burton evaluates the effect of
international naming and shaming by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
international organizations such as the UN, and the news media on measures of human
rights, while Lupu estimates the effect of ICCPR ratification on the extent to which
governments protect both civil rights (e.g., speech, association, assembly, religion) and
physical integrity rights. In both studies, the presence of a positive correlation between an
intervention and a country’s respect for one set of rights and a second, negative
correlation between that intervention and respect for another set of rights is taken as
evidence for the counteraction hypothesis. We show that in both cases, the evidence is
insufficient to support counteraction.
In replicating Hafner-Burton, we find no strong or statistically significant effect of
NGO shaming on political rights and only weak evidence for an adverse effect on
physical integrity rights. In this case, the argument for counteraction fails the first
necessary criterion for counteraction: that the policy intervention affects the targeted
outcome. Even if one is to accept the presence of the effect on physical integrity rights,
the absence of any corresponding change in political rights directly contradicts the
hypothesis that states are “trading off” rights. In the case of Lupu, we do find some

Hafner-Burton 2008; Lupu 2013.
For citations of this finding of Hafner-Burton see, for example, Conrad and DeMeritt 2014; Conrad and
Moore 2010; Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012. The article has been cited nearly
600 times.
64
65
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evidence of the primary effect on the targeted outcome -- ratification improves some
measures of civil rights. However, illustrating the usefulness of the sensitivity analysis, in
applying it, we find that the true, unmediated effect of ICCPR ratification on physical
integrity rights would have to be much larger than is theoretically plausible to sustain the
counteraction argument.
First, we turn to Hafner-Burton’s analysis, which considers the effects that
international naming and shaming campaigns have on governments’ respect for civil
liberties and for personal integrity rights. The article’s strongest results are for the effect
of naming and shaming by an NGO -- Amnesty International (AI) -- on abuses of
physical integrity rights. We focus specifically on replicating the country-year OLS
results presented in Table 2 with a few important modifications.
Hafner-Burton measures physical integrity rights violations using a composite
index of repression obtained by adding together the CIRI scores for the four physical
integrity measures: killing, torture, imprisonment, and disappearances. This yields a
variable that ranges from 0 (no violations on any of the four measures) to 8 (worst scores
on all four measures). This is then regressed using OLS on a measure of NGO advocacy
and shaming obtained by summing the number of press releases and background reports
that AI issued for a given country in a given year and then taking the log, rescaling the
measure to have mean 0. 66 The regression models also include indicators for whether a
state has signed the Convention Against Torture and the ICCPR respectively, a measure
of democracy that coarsens the conventional Polity IV scale into a binary indicator based
on whether the score is above or below 6, the logged GDP per capita in a given country
While not clearly stated in the original paper, country-year observations with zero AI press releases or
reports were arbitrarily coded 0.1 to avoid problems with taking the log of 0.
66
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year, the log of population, and whether the country is experiencing a civil war or an
interstate war. All of these regressors are lagged by one year. In addition to these
covariates, the models include lags of the outcome variable. For the physical integrity
rights outcome, one-, two-, and three-period lags of the outcome are included as
regressors along with time fixed-effects. Hafner-Burton then regresses a measure of
political rights using the same model specification except with only the one-period lagged
outcome included as a regressor. The political rights measure comes from ratings done by
Freedom House and ranges from 0 (no violations) to 6 (extreme repression).
While the results presented in this regression suggest AI shaming has the effect of
worsening repression, they do not, in the same regression, present evidence that shaming
also has a statistically significant positive effect on political rights. Rather, the combined
argument for counteraction appears to come from the combination of different
regressions on different time spans, with different identification strategies, some of which
show an effect on one form of rights and some on another. 67 Even when using similar
selection-on-observables identification strategies, the effects presented are identified on
two different subsamples: Freedom House scores are available as far back as 1972 for
some states while the CIRI scores start in the early 1980s. Combining these results to
infer counteraction is problematic not only because they do not by themselves imply the
existence of a counteraction effect (as our sensitivity analysis technique shows), but they
may also not even imply the existence of both effects for a common set of states. Effect

67
Table 3 in Hafner-Burton 2008 uses instruments and finds the statistical significance of the terror
relationship with shaming disappears but that shaming is associated with higher political rights. Table 4 in
Hafner-Burton 2008 isolates effects to different regions, finding a significant association between shaming
and higher terror and a significant association between shaming and better political rights in the Asia and
America regions.
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heterogeneity, both over time and across units means that at a minimum, data-driven
arguments for substitution or trade-off need to show effects on a common population.
We replicated these results with a few adjustments and corrections to the original
data set. First, we estimated the effects on both outcomes only for the period for which
data on both political and physical integrity rights (including the required lags) were
available: 1984 to 2001. Second, we addressed an issue in the original data in which
numerous observations were missing data on population. This gave us a slightly larger
time-series cross-sectional data set than the one presented in the original paper (2,173
versus 1,828 country-years) and corrected for the possibility that these were not missing
at random. Third, we rescaled the logged shaming measure so that it had a standard
deviation of 1 to help aid in interpreting the regression coefficients. Finally, in addition to
estimating the original specifications, we estimated two specifications for the physical
integrity rights measure with fewer lagged outcome variables. Figure 1 presents the
estimated effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the AI shaming measure for all
four models.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

We find a slight but statistically insignificant effect of NGO shaming on improved
political rights. Additionally, if we accept Hafner-Burton’s original identification strategy
and use three lags of the outcome in the regression, we fail to find a statistically
significant effect of shaming on the physical integrity itself. Only when we drop all but a
single lag do we recover the original, statistically significant finding. However, this is
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likely driven by omitted variable bias if we believe that Amnesty International’s
propensity to shame a given country is influenced by multi-year trends in abuses over
time.
Even if we accept that identification is credible given a single period lag, the
results would be enough to show an effect on only physical integrity rights and not
counteraction between political and physical integrity rights. This is because, as we set
out, showing the former using the dual correlation method requires a first-stage effect on
the targeted outcome. This is both a theoretical and practical concern -- if the policy is
doing nothing to alter the targeted outcome then there exists no constraint in the way that
the counteraction hypothesis suggests. Practically, credible inference on treatment effects
via instrumental variables techniques requires a strong first-stage effect. When
instruments are “weak,” point estimates and standard errors based on asymptotic
approximations, as in the case of 2SLS, are biased and have particularly poor
performance. 68 This can be seen intuitively from the form of the 2SLS estimator in the
single instrument/single endogenous variable case, which is a ratio of two OLS
coefficients. When the denominator is close to 0 (no effect of A on M), the resulting
2SLS estimate will be extremely large and extremely variable. We therefore omit
presenting a sensitivity analysis of the Hafner-Burton result since the results fail to show
even the minimum necessary conditions for counteraction to be plausible and, indeed,

A number of thresholds based on the first-stage F-statistic for inclusion of the instrument (with a single
instrument, just the squared t-statistic) have been proposed in the literature. See Staiger and Stock 1997;
Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002. In the case of the Lupu replication, the first-stage F on ICCPR ratification is
5.21, suggesting a reasonable but not particular strong first-stage estimate. In general, Angrist and Pischke
note that in the presence of a weak instrument, IV estimates tend to be very imprecise (209). We consider
this a feature rather than a bug of our approach because we consider strong evidence that the intervention
actually improves behavior a necessary condition to persuasively conclude that a counteraction mechanism
may be operating.
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any sensitivity analysis in this case is likely to be both extremely high-variance and
potentially misleading.
To demonstrate counteraction through the dual-regression method, researchers
must establish that, at minimum, the policy intervention affects the targeted outcome of
interest. Without this first step, any counteraction is entirely speculative. Given what we
find in replicating Hafner-Burton’s main regression, we cannot conclude that the results
provide evidence that “governments continue or expand their use of political terror … to
cancel out other improvements governments make but do not want to work.” 69 The
replication cannot establish any initial improvement to counteract and the results showing
expansion of political terror are themselves questionable given what we expect regarding
omitted variable bias. 70 In sum, we find no support for the article’s claims about
counteraction.
Next, we turn to Lupu, who primarily focuses on assessing the extent to which the
effect of international human rights treaties depends on domestic courts’ ability to
credibly enforce those rights. He theorizes that civil rights violations are easier to
prosecute compared to violations of physical integrity rights (e.g., torture) as a result of
variation in the costs of producing evidence. Because governments’ abuses of physical
integrity rights are much harder to document, courts will be much less able to force
governments to abide by international legal commitments with respect to those rights.
The theory predicts that ICCPR ratification will improve governments’ performance on
indicators of civil rights (e.g., freedom of speech, association, etc.) while having no effect
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on performance for indicators of physical integrity rights. Rights measures are taken from
the CIRI data set and take on values from 0 to 2 with 0 denoting frequent/severe
violations, 1 denoting occasional violations, and 2 denoting no reported violations.
Using a series of ordinal probit regression models estimated on a country-year
data set, Lupu finds a positive and statistically significant association between ICCPR
ratification and three indicators of civil and political rights from the CIRI data set:
freedom of association, freedom of speech, and religious freedom. He finds no
statistically significant association between ICCPR ratification and three out of the four
physical integrity variables (killings, torture, and imprisonment) but does find that
ICCPR ratifiers have worse CIRI ratings on disappearances. The regression models
control for measures of judicial independence, democracy (as measured by the Polity IV
scale), regime durability, civil war, external war, logged GDP per capita, log population,
and a measure of the number of international NGOs the state is a member of. The models
also control for the one-year lag of the outcome and include fixed effects for each year.
With the surprising finding of a negative effect for disappearance, Lupu suggests
that counteraction may be to blame. While describing the claim as “tentative” he posits
that “because ICCPR commitment constrains governments’ ability to restrict the
freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion, they may turn to harsher
methods, for which evidence is less costly to hide, to accomplish what they no longer can
with less egregious human rights violations.” 71 This is clearly a claim about
counteraction, in that the constraint placed on civil and political rights is hypothesized to
directly influence the expanded use of disappearance.
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FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

We replicate these four regressions, fitting ordinary least squares regressions of
the CIRI score on the same linear additive models proposed in the original paper. 72 We
also make a few slight corrections to the data to obtain a larger sample size (2,155 versus
1,966 as reported in the data). Figure 3 presents our estimated effects of ICCPR
ratification on each CIRI score. We replicate the originally reported pattern for measures
of association and disappearances. If we assume that conventional significance levels are
appropriate -- an important normative question not considered here -- we do not find a
statistically significant effect (α = .05) on speech or religious freedom. On average,

ICCPR ratifiers have a .06 higher score on association and a .05 lower CIRI score with
respect to disappearances.

Implementing the Sensitivity Analysis
Our method stresses the importance of a sensitivity analysis to help interpret the
observed effects and the plausibility of counteraction. Given our finding, what can we
say about the plausibility of counteraction between improvements in association rights
and the worsening of disappearances? Figure 2 plots the sensitivity analysis for the 2SLS
estimate of the counteraction effect for varying levels of the exclusion restriction
violation. The light gray line denotes the naive estimate: what our estimated effect would

We choose not to estimate ordered probit models as in the original paper. In practice, even with nonlinearities in outcome variables, OLS will provide a best linear approximation to the causal response function.
Additionally, 2SLS requires linear models for both stages. See Angrist 2001.
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be if we believed ICCPR ratification had no effect on disappearances aside from its effect
on association rights. In this case, the effect is negative, consistent with counteraction,
but imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant at any conventional rejection
threshold (p = 0.177). Notably, although the two reduced-form estimates were
statistically significant and in opposite directions, implied estimate of the causal effect of
one outcome on the other is not statistically significant. This highlights one possible
drawback of our method -- we give up some statistical power in exchange for more
flexible assumptions. If we were to assume that there is no direct effect of ICCPR
ratification on CIRI disappearance -- in other words, assuming that counteraction or a
trade-off is the only possible mechanism -- then the estimated average effect of ICCPR
ratification on CIRI disappearance would equal the indirect effect and the two-stage
approach would be unnecessary unless the specific effect of association on disappearance
scores was of interest. However, because we do not want to simply assert that
counteraction is the only possible mechanism but instead assess the plausibility of an
indirect effect for a variety of possible direct effects, we need to accept some reduction in
power to properly conduct inference on the effect of the mediator. For reasonable sample
sizes, we consider the reduction in power when 𝑑𝑑 is close to 0 to be far outweighed by
the risk of falsely concluding in favor of an indirect effect when there exists a strong
direct effect. Since the goal of sensitivity analyses is to be conservative in drawing
inferences, we consider the increase in estimation uncertainty to be a reasonable sacrifice.
When we vary the assumed size of the direct effect of ICCPR ratification on CIRI
disappearance score, we conclude that there is a small range of direct effects for which
we would obtain a statistically significant (p < .05) and negative indirect effect of an
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increase in CIRI association scores on CIRI disappearance scores. Notably, if the direct
effect is itself negative (the backlash argument), then the estimated indirect effect is
either close to 0 or actually positive. This matches the intuition behind our sensitivity
analysis -- the presence of a negative direct effect explains away a counteraction or tradeoff hypothesis. In a setting where counteraction is more plausible, we would see negative
and statistically significant effects even when allowing for some amount of backlash. In
the case of Lupu, this does not appear to be so.
Instead of asking how much of a negative direct effect is enough to “break” the
result, for the Lupu analysis, we consider how much of a positive direct effect is enough
to suggest some counteraction. In other words, do we think that the observed effect of the
intervention on the spillover outcome is too small compared to what we would expect,
suggesting some counteraction. In the Lupu data, we find that to reject the null hypothesis
of no counteraction at α = .05, the direct effect of ICCPR ratification would have to be
positive and equivalent to about .1 standard deviation of the outcome.

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

The sensitivity analysis is helpful because it helps probe the counteraction
claim’s plausibility. Importantly, counteraction becomes plausible only when our prior
beliefs about the true effect of ICCPR ratification are particularly strong and we need to
explain away the “surprise” of a smaller-than-expected finding. Plotting the counteraction
effect for varying levels of the exclusion restriction violation illustrates what the
estimated effect would be if we believed ICCPR ratification affected disappearances only
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through association rights. The sensitivity analysis thus allows us to consider whether the
intervention’s observed effect on the spillover outcome is too small compared to what we
would expect, which would suggest some counteraction. In the case of Lupu, we find that
to reject the null hypothesis of no counteraction, the direct effect of ICCPR ratification
would have to be positive and about .1 standard deviation of the outcome. While a 0.1
standard deviation effect may seem somewhat small, suggesting plausibility of
counteraction, in this context, it is more sensible to compare to a known benchmark
effect. The vertical dark gray line in Figure 4 denotes the estimated counteraction effect if
we assume that the direct effect of ICCPR ratification on the disappearance score was of
the same standardized size as ICCPR ratification’s effect on the association rights score.
Even if this were true, our analysis would fail to reject the null of no effect at α = .05.

We emphasize the importance of finding plausible bounding values for the direct

effect when conducting the sensitivity analyses because it is always possible to find a
range of direct effect parameter values that would yield both strong positive and strong
negative indirect effect estimates. Analogous work on sensitivity analyses for the case of
unobserved confounding has often proposed relying on relationships between observed
quantities and the outcome of interest as “benchmarks” for determining what is a
reasonable magnitude of unobserved confounding -- for example, arguing that a result is
robust to an unobserved confounder that is as strong as the strongest observed predictor
of treatment and outcome. 73 However, we caution against using any single
benchmarking approach that is not informed by substantive knowledge. As Cinelli and
However, see recent work by Cinelli and Hazlett 2020 (Appendix A.2) arguing that informal benchmarking
approaches for unobserved confounding can be highly misleading because the true effects of observed
confounders used as benchmarks may not be identifiable from the regressions omitting the unobserved
confounder.
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Hazlett argue, sensitivity analyses provide a basis for “principled argument” rather than
an “automatic procedure” for assessing the underlying research design’s correctness. 74
Therefore, our recommendation to begin with the “first-stage” effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 as a
benchmark for the direct effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 should be understood as the first step in
assessing plausible direct effect values and not the final one. A researcher’s goal in

selecting reasonable sensitivity parameters is to determine how large of an effect the
intervention could have in general on any outcome and then assess how these effects
would compare in size to the unobserved direct effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on the specific outcome 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 .
Subject matter knowledge about the known effects of the intervention should guide
researchers here.
If an intervention is known to have relatively weak effects on most relevant
outcomes and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is not uniquely different from those outcomes, then that suggests values
of the sensitivity parameter far away from 0 are unlikely. One reasonable approach to
quantifying this may be to benchmark the direct effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 using the largest

known effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on any outcome. We recommend starting with the effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖

precisely because its identification is a prerequisite to the exercise of assessing

counteraction and because researchers are likely to have existing beliefs about the relative
size of this effect compared to others. However, estimating effects on other outcomes
may be useful as well, with the caveat that the set of controls needed to identify the effect
of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 may not be the same set needed to identify the effect of the intervention on
all relevant outcomes. The choice of reasonable bounding values will always involve a

combination of quantitative knowledge about the general effects of the intervention with
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qualitative knowledge about how those effects compare with the unobserved direct effect
on the outcome of interest.
We can illustrate this combination of quantitative and qualitative knowledge using
Lupu’s theoretical argument for counteraction. The domestic courts theory posits that
because courts are more capable of enforcing civil rights compared to physical integrity
rights as a result of differences in the availability of information, the effect of an
international rights commitment will be larger for civil rights than for physical integrity
rights. The direct effect of ICCPR ratification on personal integrity rights is therefore
unlikely to be greater than the effect of ratification on civil rights, making the estimated
effect of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 on 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 a plausible extreme bound for the sensitivity parameter. Based on this
benchmark, the most feasible values for ratification’s direct effect will lie to the left of

the dark gray line in Figure 4, all of which imply no statistically significant counteraction
effect. In other words, Lupu introduced a counteraction hypothesis to explain the
appearance of an effect where he anticipated finding a null based on a theoretical
argument that predicted a direct effect of ICCPR ratification close to zero -- governments
ratifying human rights treaties are unlikely to face significant litigation with respect to
personal integrity rights compared to civil rights and therefore have fewer incentives for
improvement. However, a formal analysis suggests that the gap between what was
expected and what was observed does not provide much evidence for counteraction. The
small but surprising negative effect on disappearances is not sufficiently surprising for us
to conclude that counteraction is occurring.

Conclusion
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We live in a world where, despite the best efforts of well-meaning advocates,
human rights violations continue. The determination of some leaders to maintain power
and privilege through repression has led to widespread speculation that human rights
advocates may actually exacerbate rather than alleviate the problem. 75 Critics suggest that
resources have been shifting to the hopeless quest of improving rights (at the expense of
development, equality, or social justice); targeted governments and their populations are
starting to lash back against international pressure; and clever despots have connived to
replace open violations with stealth repression. These accounts allege that the international
human rights project is worse than ineffective.
Such negative consequences are just as important to understand as any other
effect, but they should be subject to the same evidentiary standards as the rest of social
science. We have discussed at least three types mechanisms to explain negative spillovers
of human right interventions -- backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction -- that scholars
have recently offered as reasons to throttle back on international human rights efforts.
These claims may be plausible; all merit serious attention. But only a few researchers
provide systematic evidence for such claims. Even fewer provide evidence that support
their causal arguments.
Unfortunately, evidence from the effects of interventions alone is insufficient to
demonstrate the existence of a particular causal mechanism when the claimed effect is
theorized to be indirect or mediated. As a first-order concern, inference on the overall
effects of interventions is extremely challenging because interventions target problem-
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ridden countries, generating a significant degree of potential omitted variable bias.
However, even if we grant that researchers have credibly identified the first-order effects
of these interventions, their leap to making conclusions about the second-order effects
and their underlying mechanisms requires additional assumptions regarding the
underlying causal structure that may not be credible.
We have outlined three mechanisms by which interventions to improve human
rights may have negative spillover effects on other outcomes. Counteraction is one such
mechanism which we carefully define as a change in state behavior such that either the
incidence or level of a spillover outcome increases in a way that is attributable to the
change in the targeted outcome driven by the intervention. We connect this to the concept
of a mediation or indirect effect in the causal inference literature and note the importance
of showing a strong first-order effect of the intervention as a prerequisite to any
theorizing about counteraction mechanisms. Unless the intervention has, ceteris paribus,
some positive consequences, there is nothing to counter and there is no mediation.
This is not to claim that governments who sign human rights treaties or
experience harsh external criticisms do not (often, perhaps) do very bad things. But the
counteraction theory requires a demonstration both that the external treatment caused bad
results, and that the causal mechanism driving this effect is an improvement in the
targeted area of rights. In much of the literature, there is very little scrutiny given to such
causal claims, even though such mechanisms are harder to assess empirically than “black
box” correlations. 76
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If researchers are going to use quantitative data to assess mechanisms like
counteraction, they need to model it explicitly. We have presented a method for assessing
counteraction that requires fewer assumptions than a full causal mediation analysis and
can be easily adapted to the regression approaches researchers often use for estimating
the effects of interventions. In the two cases we explore, both of which suggest that
interventions caused compensatory actions by governments, we find that either there
exists no first-order impact of the hypothesized intervention or the intervention’s
expected direct impact on the spillover outcome would have had to be so large and so
positive as to be implausible given our theoretical expectations. We conclude that it is far
more likely that deteriorating rights have more to do with garden-variety selection effects
or possibly alternative mechanisms than they do with strategic counteraction.
We focused primarily on counteraction because quantitative research has been
used to back such claims. But the approach we suggest is appropriate for any theory that
links unintended outcomes to mediated, or indirect effects. For example, claims about
budgetary trade-offs would have to show that by making human rights a priority, some
other indicator of human welfare, such as social justice, suffered a reduction in resources
that in turn accounts for growing inequality. Similarly, arguments that the very task of
improving human rights has negative downstream consequences will be more convincing
when they demonstrate that human rights law and advocacy has first had its intended
effect of improving rights -- that is, there is some positive rights outcome to counter. The
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methods we propose could be used to shed light on a range of claims about unintended
consequences found loosely stated in the literature. 77
Our general approach can also be useful, in somewhat modified form, to test for
unintended consequences in other issue areas. For example, a government facing a budget
constraint might choose to fund technologies that replace coal power plants, but scale
back efforts to reduce automobile emissions (trade-offs); might oppose plans to reduce
carbon emissions by stimulating political or social resistance (backlash) or might respond
to pressure to reduce carbon emissions by requiring an expensive technology, but counter
the effects of that on companies by allowing them to lower their standards in another area
to offset those costs, essentially then merely shifting a pollution problem from one type to
another (counteraction).
Negative consequences to human rights advocacy warrant continued vigilance,
and the concerns of researchers who have hypothesized trade-offs, backlash, and
counteraction are utterly valid. But there is a danger to attributing harm to international
human rights law and advocacy when they are not the cause. Counteraction is a
particularly serious mechanism since its existence implies that no intervention could
potentially improve rights across the board since improving rights in one area would
cause denigration of human rights in other areas to compensate for the improvements.
The risk of discouraging promotion of international human rights norms based on underidentified causal mechanisms is very serious indeed. Statistical science aside, we would
argue that even if committing to and advocating international human rights sometimes

For example, a backlash argument, as we discussed could also be unmediated: backlash could focus on the
intervention per se, even if rights never improve.
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cause some harm, this would not necessarily justify silence. Rather, it should prompt
consideration of means to blunt the effects of counteraction. While this is not the place to
elaborate, we think moral grounds alone might justify continued rhetorical and
substantive support for international human rights. These are philosophical and practical
questions for policymakers and the international community to answer together. Our
purpose has been to avoid unsupported inferences and point a way toward investigating
these issues more rigorously to implement the most effective policies to improve human
rights for the world’s most vulnerable populations.
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TABLE 1. The logic of three spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction
Description
A policy intervention aimed at improving
human rights (M) triggers a broad reaction
or countermobilization that ultimately
Backlash
causes a worsening in one area of human
rights (Y) irrespective of any realized
improvements
A policy intervention prioritizes one area
of human rights (M), thereby reducing
attention to other issue areas (Y),
Trade-offs
(economic development, equality, justice).
The result is a worsening in the other issue
area(s).
A policy intervention improves human
rights in one area (M). As a direct
consequence of this improvement, changes
Counteraction
in government behavior result in a
worsening of human rights in another
sector (Y).
Note: M=targeted violation; Y=spillover effect

Condition

Mechanism

Outcome

M and Y are
related, but
may be
complements
or substitutes

Socially
generated
reaction

M: agnostic
Y: worsens

M and Y are
strict
substitutes

Resource
constraint
unintentionally
forces a tradeoff

M: improves
Y: worsens

Violator(s)
views M and
Y as
substitutes

Strategic elite
choice under
the constraint
of monitoring,
obligation, or
shaming

M: improves
Y: worsens
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FIGURE 1. Graphical representation of causal pathways
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Notes: Point estimates denote coefficients on the standardized logged Amnesty International coverage
variable from OLS regression with all covariates + year fixed effects. Lines denote 95 percent robust
standard errors clustered by country. N = 2,173, Countries = 140; Coverage: 1984 --- 2001.
FIGURE 2. Replication of main effects of NGO shaming from Hafner-Burton 2008
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year fixed effects. Lines denote 95 percent robust standard errors clustered by country. N = 2,155,
Countries = 144; Coverage: 1982 --- 1999.
FIGURE 3. Replication of main effects of ICCPR ratification from Lupu 2013
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FIGURE 4. Sensitivity analysis for counteraction in Lupu 2013
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